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As a teacher of undergraduates, I want to make the argu-
ment that courses in American Constitutional Law should em-
phasize a wide range of topics, including constitutional theory, 
the process of Supreme Court decision-making, and how the Su-
preme Court brings change in political, economic, and social life 
into constitutional law. We should also present students with 
some of the methods of analysis and definitions of institutions 
and institutional change that inform the emerging historical insti-
tutional or politics and history approach to American political 
development. I have written elsewhere about the importance of 
teaching constitutional theory and the process of social construc-
tion by the Supreme Court as ways to bring the outside world 
into supreme Court decision-making. The following eight para-
graphs are taken from that article, which may be hard for read-
ers of this journal to locate.1 
Intellectual movements, such as Feminist Theory, Critical 
Legal Studies, and Critical Race Theory, are central to under-
standing how political and social change is facilitated through 
law. Students want to know how change in constitutional law 
occurs and how such changes inform the process of change in the 
wider society. The link between such intellectual movements 
and legal change requires a consideration of the role of the in-
terpretive community in the development of constitutional law. 
Why do very smart constitutional scholars seek to develop new 
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1. See Ronald Kahn, Bringing the Outside World into Supreme Coun Decision 
Making, 14 Focus on Law Studies: Teaching About Law in the Liberal Ans 5, 16 (Fall 
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constitutional movements, theories, and ways of looking at con-
stitutional questions? Why is so much passion exhibited by 
scholars and their students in support of or in opposition to 
feminist, critical legal studies, and critical race approaches to the 
law? 
One reason for the important role of such intellectual 
movements is that scholars are trying to influence the "interpre-
tive community." According to Owen Fiss, the interpretive 
community includes jurists, legal journalists, practitioners, legal 
change advocates, other scholars, and the informed public. 
Scholars are trying to persuade the interpretive community to 
accept new conceptions of what the polity and principles in con-
stitutional law should be, as well as how they should be applied. 
For instance, civic republicans, such as Cass Sunstein and Frank 
Michelman, contend that ensuring rigorous informed delibera-
tion on constitutional matters can only be facilitated by engaging 
the general public. For feminist scholars like Catharine MacK-
innon, the objective is to demonstrate the impact of gender-
based power disparities in society at large on law and the legal 
system. Critical legal scholars argue that "the law" is what 
judges say it is. Since judges are from the upper class and accept 
the value premises of the wider society, such as those of capital-
ism and pluralism, court decision-making is not viewed as 
autonomous from class, social, and political structures in socie-
ties. Thus, for critical legal scholars, class, social, and political 
inequalities are simply reflected in the law. They therefore un-
derstate the force of law and legal institutions on social change. 
To understand how the Supreme Court is influenced from 
without by social and political forces, students should become 
aware of differences that exist among members of the interpre-
tive community on how individual rights intersect with judicial 
decision making. Additionally, they should be exposed to the 
role that courts play in the wider political system, as well as how 
political, social, and economic considerations affect court deci-
sions. They must consider such questions through the study of 
conventional constitutional theories as well as in representative 
scholarship from new intellectual movements. These intellectual 
movements allow new questions to be asked about social and 
political change, questions whose answers could positively affect 
society as a whole. Examples include: To what degree has con-
stitutional law met the needs of a changing society? Which ideas 
central to these intellectual movements have made their way 
into constitutional law and why? How is the rule of law affected, 
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positively or negatively, by the central contentions developed by 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS}, Critical Race Theory (CRT), and 
Feminist Jurisprudence? What elements from more conventional 
constitutional theory can actually help sustain political and social 
change in a diverse society? 
Students should also come to see how scholars from these 
intellectual movements understand the role of law and courts in 
the process of political and social change. They should begin to 
evaluate the implications of focusing on the critical approaches 
to constitutional law just as they must consider the implications 
of relying on conventional rights-based constitutional theory. 
Similarly, in exploring cases with students, instructors need to 
identify examples in which Supreme Court justices accept or re-
ject premises that are central to these critical intellectual move-
ments. This practice is consistent with what we do in our analy-
sis of more conventional approaches, including our theoretical 
assessments of originalism and non-originalism in constitutional 
interpretation. For example, why does the Supreme Court talk 
of "personhood" rather than privacy in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the decision in which a Su-
preme Court consisting of a majority of Reagan-Bush appointees 
refused to overturn the fundamental right to abortion choice 
first enunciated in Roe v. Wade? 
Study of these intellectual movements is very exciting to 
students because it opens up for them the possibilities and limits 
of law in effecting social change. Most importantly, through 
comparison of conventional and critical approaches to law and 
legal theory, students can ask themselves whether they wish to 
participate-as lawyers, judges, legal scholars, or political scien-
tists-in the interpretive community. I must emphasize that the 
primary objective in my American Constitutional Law class is 
not to produce lawyers or members of the interpretive commu-
nity. However, one of the major reasons that students become 
scholars or practitioners in any particular field-whether the 
field is chemistry, political science, or law-is that they see us as 
teachers and mentors who enjoy engaging in research and ex-
ploring new intellectual puzzles. That is why so many Ph.D.s, 
scholars, and legal theorists traditionally come from liberal arts 
colleges, where they have opportunities to work closely with in-
structors in research seminars, in honors courses, and as research 
assistants. 
There are drawbacks to presenting only one approach to 
Supreme Court decision making: students may come to view one 
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movement as the "correct" one, rather than affording due con-
sideration to divergent approaches, be they conventional or 
critical. If we as teachers were to present only one approach, we 
would deny to students the opportunity to fairly evaluate con-
flicting interpretive models. At the undergraduate level, pre-
senting the competing interpretive frameworks allows students 
to make authentic assessments of their theoretical coherence and 
practical value. By imparting to students the ability to critically 
analyze such approaches, instructors are passing on "tools" 
which will be invaluable in graduate, law, and professional 
school. On the personal side, although I am an interpretive em-
piricist and a non-originalist, I am proud of the fact that my stu-
dents have become behavioral political scientists and originalist 
scholars. 
However, studying new intellectual movements will not 
necessarily explain how social, economic, and political change 
directly influence Supreme Court decision making. For exam-
ple, Justices might accept or reject John Hart Ely's vision of 
rights under the equal protection clause, or Lani Guinier's vision 
of representation and voting rights. In so doing, one can identify 
which conceptions from the interpretive community have af-
fected actual court decisions. However, to explain how the out-
side world comes into constitutional law, we need to do more. 
We need to place the Supreme Court decision making process 
into a wider historical framework, beyond the level of intellec-
tual movements, ideas, and interpretation. To do this we need to 
ask under what conditions new social constructs come into the 
law, which become part of precedents.2 It is quite clear that 
2. See Ronald Kahn, Liberalism, Political Culture, and the Rights of Subordinated 
Groups: Constitutional Theory and Practice at a Crossroads, in David F. Ericson and 
Louisa Bertch Green, eds., The Liberal Tradition In American Politics: Reassessing The 
Legacy Of American Liberalism 171-97, 254-59 (Routledge, 1999). See also Ronald 
Kahn, Institutional Norms and the Historical Development of Supreme Court Politics: 
Changing "Social Facts" and Doctrinal Development, in Howard Gillman and Cornell 
Oayton, eds., The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpreta-
tions 43-59 (U. Press of Kansas, 1999); and Ronald Kahn, New (Historical) Institutional-
ism: Relating Supreme Court Decision Making to Social, Political and Economic Change, 
in Ronald Kahn, ed., 9 A Law and Courts Symposium: Courts, Law, and the New (His-
torical) Institutionalism, Law and Courts 1, 3, 12-13 (Spring, 1999). Finally, see two re-
cent papers on the role of social constructs in Supreme Court decision-making and 
American constitutional development: The Role of "Precedential Social Facts" in Rever-
sals of Landmark Supreme Court Decisions: The Rights of Subordinated Groups to Ex-
pression, Religion, Privacy, and Equal Protection, (Paper presented to Panel on Legiti-
macy of Arguments, Evidence, and Amendments, 1999 Annual Meeting, American 
Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2-5, 1999) (on file with author); 
and New Historical Institutionalism, Precedential Social Constructs, Political Culture, and 
Doctrinal Change: Gender Discrimination in the Twentieth Century (with Susan Den-
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judges ask what constitutes "liberty" interests in light of a 
changing society, as we saw in Justice Harlan's concept of "or-
dered liberty" in Poe v. Ullman and Griswold v. Connecticut. 
Yet too few scholars of Supreme Court decision making have 
studied the role and development of social constructs in the law. 
Do such visions of society get passed on from landmark cases, as 
the Court considers new constitutional questions? What is the 
relationship of policy and principles to the way social constructs 
are formulated by non-originalists on the Court? Exploring new 
intellectual developments can help us gain a more precise under-
standing of social constructs in the law and begin to see how they 
effect change. 
My students are excited about studying intellectual move-
ments and appropriating ideas from a wide range of scholars to 
construct their own conceptions of the role of law in ameliorat-
ing problems of race, gender, and class in our society. Critical 
engagement with these differing theoretical traditions helps stu-
dents synthesize, as well as controvert, ideas that they encounter 
in other courses. Indeed, this is the very mark of a serious lib-
eral arts education. Additionally, it brings great pleasure to 
teach American Constitutional Law at the undergraduate level 
precisely because there are many important issues which are best 
illuminated at the intersection of the humanities and social sci-
ences. Studying intellectual movements stimulates such cross-
currents of knowledge. By examining the role that courts play as 
forums for social change and introducing different views about 
what values should be incorporated into constitutional law, stu-
dents learn to both respect and question different perspectives 
on constitutional interpretation. 
In arguing for the inclusion of constitutional theory and the 
process through which the Supreme Court brings the outside so-
cial, economic, and political world into its decision making, I am 
taking issue with some, but not all, of what my colleagues in this 
discussion group are advocating. 
I am asking that we do more than expand the cases which 
are considered necessary for the teaching of constitutional law. 
We have seen numerous examples of this in the articles in this 
Symposium. Some make valid arguments for innovation in "the 
taught" canon and constitutional law textbooks, with insights on 
nehy) (paper presented to Panel on Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Courts, 
1999 Annual Meeting, Western Political Science Association, Seattle, WA, Mar. 25-27, 
1999) (on file with author). 
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the pedagogical advantages and disadvantages of such changes 
for law school students. Louis Fisher wants students using his 
textbook to study the dialogue among the judiciary, Congress, 
the president, the states and the general public, and the role of 
the Supreme Court and courts in our political system. John 
Nowak explores the role of casebooks in law school teaching and 
the development of his textbook in the future. William Banks 
and Daan Braveman discuss how their law school text differs 
from others by including additional material on the structure of 
government and the integration of constitutional theory and doc-
trine with practical problems. J. M. Balkin and Sandy Levinson 
question the role of constitutional theory in law school teaching. 
They argue that "constitutional theories actually tend to avoid 
putting the basic justice of the legal system into question by of-
fering intricate and intellectually demanding forms of legal 
analysis as a substitute for and are a diversion from potentially 
de-legitimating inquiries about our constitutional system."3 
Many contributors make arguments for including in 'the 
canon' contributions from outside the courtroom and what 
Owen Fiss has called "the interpretive community.''4 One might 
argue that they are seeking to expand the definition of the inter-
pretive community.5 J.M. Balkin and Sandy Levinson, in what 
may be called keynote contributions for discussion, make superb 
arguments as to what the term canon means and why and how 
we should expand it.6 They call for law professors to expand the 
contribution of non-governmental, non-judicial, and non-
professionally trained lawyers, such as Frederick Douglass, to 
the canon of constitutionallaw.7 They argue for the inclusion 
into the canon of the words of leaders of social movements. I 
agree with them that students should not view constitutional law 
simply as a history of great jurists, because at key times through-
out our history, including today, the words of important agents 
of social change in and out of government are central to the de-
3. See J. M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,l11 
Harv. L. Rev. 963, 1020-2021 (1998). 
4. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 
(1982) (urging recovery of "an old and familiar idea ... that adjudication is a form of in-
terpretation"). 
5. See generally Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory, 
1953-1993 (U. Press of Kansas, 1994), for an analysis of the limitations of viewing Su-
preme Court decision making in instrumental rather than constitutive terms and an 
analysis of how the interpretive community informs the development of constitutional 
law in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist eras of the Supreme Court. 
6. See Balkin and Levinson,lll Harv. L. Rev. at 970-1002 (cited in note 3). 
7. See id at 1023. 
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velopment of constitutional questions, although their words are 
not viewed as part of the taught canon. They argue that judge-
centered law "neglects the fact that constitutional changes-in-
cluding changes in constitutional interpretation-are often the re-
sult of mass political action, which is later recognized and sancti-
fied by various legal and judicial elites. "8 
Levinson and Balkin argue that constitutional law text-
books, like their own, should place more emphasis on the reali-
ties of American politics: if constitutional law teachers do this, 
then the nature of the scholarly and pedagogical problematics 
will be quite different than those of too many law professors, 
who center their teaching on the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
of the Supreme Court.9 Through the expansion of "the canon," 
legal academics will ask more than whether courts should defer 
to legislatures or wait for the creation of new rights through the 
amendment process. They argue th<&t constitutional law teachers 
and scholars should ask themselves instead "whether judicial de-
cisions do not already reflect the political and ideological strug-
gles playing out in the larger culture, translated into the profes-
sional discourse of the law."1° For example, Levinson and Balkin 
suggest that the issue of homosexual rights is important in the 
Supreme Court, and in lesser courts, because of the development 
of a social movement that has forced courts to acknowledge that 
how we treat gay men and lesbians is a legal problem facing our 
nation, with Justices and judges now "discovering" rights in re-
sponse to a social movement that has existed outside the courts 
f l . It or a ong time. 
Levinson and Balkin make the argument for an expansion 
of the canon because they believe all Americans have the right 
and duty to interpret the Constitution and decide for themselves 
what it means. For this reason, expansion of the canon should 
be the pedagogical strategy for all teachers of constitutional law, 
at both the law school and undergraduate levels. According to 
Levinson and Balkin, constitutional law teachers have a respon-
sibility to understand that the development of the law is not sim-
ply a creation of courts, but of courts responding to social 
movements and the world outside. Such study, they say, will also 
reduce the degree to which students blindly respect the law and 
the major formal institutions which interpret it-the Supreme 
8. Id at 1022. 
9. See id 
10. Id at 1023. 
11. See id 
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Court, lower federal courts, and state courts. This concern for 
the expansion of the canon is based on our admission that the 
oppression of many of our citizens has been a central part of our 
history to this day, and that the Supreme Court and lesser courts, 
compared to legislatures at all levels and mass politics, have not 
always led us to see and reduce that oppression. Law and legal 
change may have been socially transformative, but the Supreme 
Court and lesser courts have not always led this transformation.12 
While I agree that the Constitution outside the Court 
should be studied, I question whether such a bright line should 
be drawn as Balkin and Levinson do between law and politics. I 
also question their downplaying of the impact of the role played 
by the Supreme Court and lesser courts on social change, com-
pared to outside court political action. Also, they too frequently 
assume that the Supreme Court is not considering the social, 
economic, and political realities of the day as it makes constitu-
tional choices, and that only the introduction into the canon of 
the words of leaders of mass movements will meet this problem. 
Moreover, they do not address the process through which there 
is a cross-fertilization between political, economic, and social 
changes in the wider society. I think that the introduction of the 
words of leaders of mass movements into the canon is not a suf-
ficient palliative for this needed cross-fertilization. However, as 
argued above, emphasizing the study of Supreme Court decision 
making, specifically with regard to the introduction of social con-
structions by the Supreme Court and lesser appellate courts, into 
case law as precedents, and the impact of constitutional theory 
on such introductions, may do more to help us understand the 
Constitution outside the courts than simply adding new cases 
and introducing students to the ideas of leaders of social move-
ments. The study of constitutional theory, which is oftentimes 
built upon constitutional scholars' views as to what aspects of so-
cial, economic, and political life must be brought into the law, 
may do more to expand the canon of constitutional law verti-
cally, and get our students to engage in such a process of change, 
than the addition of this or that set of admittedly important cases 
that have been ignored for too many years. 
In making this argument, I join Mark Graber, who urges us 
to expand the cases that we as constitutional law teachers should 
know, so that teachers in and out of law schools place into the 
canon insights from political science and history, thereby con-
12. See id at 1021-24. 
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tinuing the process through which the study of constitutional law 
is inter-disciplinary.13 I agree that we must draw upon the best 
work from political science, political culture, the sociology of 
mass movements, and social history, as the contributions of 
Louis Fisher, Maxwell L. Stearns, and William Wiecek also em-
phasize. 
This trend towards the inter-disciplinary study of constitu-
tional law is visible in much recent work in constitutional law 
and political science. Mark Tushnet's superb Taking the Con-
stitution Away From the Courts builds on his prior work, Red, 
White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law .14 In 
Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts, Tushnet argues 
for a "populist" constitutional law in which judicial decisions do 
not receive special consideration; he recommends that we not 
favor judicial review as a process for considering constitutional 
issues above the broader process of dialogue in the nation.15 
Tushnet argues for this position because he considers judi-
cial review to consist of a record of errors brought about by the 
Supreme Court's refusal to follow the "thin Constitution." The 
"thin Constitution," according to Tushnet, includes the funda-
mental American principles in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Preamble to the Constitution, which constitute a set of 
principles that the full citizenry, not just courts, should protect.16 
The notion here is that the Supreme Court and the process of 
judicial review should not be trusted more than Congress and 
other institutions, and clearly not more than the American citi-
zenry, which should participate in a broader deliberative process. 
For years Tushnet, Levinson, and Balkin have bridged the 
gap between constitutional law/theory and political science; too 
few law school-centered constitutional law scholars and teachers 
have done this. Political scientists have been bridging the gap 
for years. A less than full listing of political scientists who have 
been bridging the gap include: Edward Corwin, Walter Murphy, 
13. See generally Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officialing: A Misunderstood 
and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 Const. Comm. 293 (1999), in which he argues for 
the interdisciplinary analysis of the merits of Ronald Dworkin's constitutional theories. 
14. See generally Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 
(Princeton U. Press, 1999) (discussion of tension between Supreme Court decisions on 
liberty and popular political power); and Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of 
Constitutional Law (Harvard U. Press, 1988) (examination of arguments on judicial re-
view). 
15. See Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts at 182-87 (cited in 
note 14). 
16. See id at 9-14. 
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C. Herman Pritchett, and, more recently, Howard Gillman, Mi-
chael McCann, Rogers Smith, and Gerry Rosenberg, in addition 
to Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming, Malcolm Feeley, Louis 
Fisher, Mark Graber, and Joel B. Grossman.17 
In addition to Tushnet, Levinson, and Balkin, Cass Sunstein 
is another law school scholar who has attempted to bridge the 
gap between constitutional law/theory and political science. In 
his most recent book, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minima/ism 
on the Supreme Court, Sunstein argues for the incremental ap-
proach to legal change by the Supreme Court, that is, for the 
Court to decide one case at a time and to avoid broad rulings.18 
This would allow the political system to deliberate on constitu-
tional questions and ensure flexibility in the development of the 
law. All the Justices on the contemporary Rehnquist Court, 
other than the originalists, who are maximalists, not minimalists, 
in Sunstein's terms, engage in judicial minimalism, as is evident 
in the areas of affirmative action, homosexuality and gender dis-
crimination, and First Amendment issues regarding the Internet 
and telecommunication changes. We must consider the validity 
of Sunstein's insights on the Supreme Court and social change 
and the implications of those insights, if they are valid, for "the 
canon" we teach. 
However, I must join Sotirios A. Barber and James E. 
Fleming, who provide a needed cautionary note on the ideas of 
Levinson, Tushnet, and Sunstein. They caution against placing 
the idea of the Constitution too far outside the Supreme Court 
and the courts. Their comments, and others, convince me that 
the responsibilities of an undergraduate constitutional law 
17. See generally EdwardS. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. 
Rev. 1 (1950) (arguing that power has shifted to the federal government and away from 
the states); Walter Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (U. of Chicago Press, 1964); 
and C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 
1937-1947 (MacMillan Co., 1948) (critical review of non-unanimous Supreme Court 
opinions). For more recent scholarship that bridges the gap between constitutional 
law/theory and political science, see generally Howard Gillman, The Constitution Be-
sieged (Duke U. Press,1993); Michael McCann, Rights At Work: Pay Equity Reform and 
the Politics of Legal Mobilization (U. of Chicago Press, 1994) (review of "the value of law 
for empowering ... citizens"); Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals (Yale U. Press, 1997); and 
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The HoUow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (U. of 
Chicago Press, 1991). See also the following contributions to this symposium: Sotirios A. 
Barber and James E. Fleming, The Canon and the Constitution Outside the Courts, and 
Louis Fisher, The Canons of Constitutional Law: Teaching With a Political-Historical 
Framework. 
18. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the 
Supreme Court (Harvard U. Press, 1999) (describing "procedural and substantive com-
ponents" on judicial minimalism). 
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teacher are different from those of law school professors who 
have an obligation to teach their students to be lawyers. How-
ever, the more I read the thoughts of my colleagues here, some 
of whom have taught undergraduates as well as law school stu-
dents, in creative ways, the more I feel that the difference in the 
roles of undergraduate and graduate teachers of constitutional 
law may be exaggerated. 
